The nuclear relapse has derailed -- literally!

Photo by Tom Clements, Alliance for Nuclear Accountability (ANA)Tom Clements of Alliance for Nuclear Accountability in South Carolina has documented, in photo and blog, a most remarkable development: the AP1000 nuclear reactor vessel targeted at Vogtle, Georgia has been discovered unprotected, stranded in Savannah Port since a December 15 shipment failure. Tom's remarkable blog is posted at the Aiken Leader. Connect Savannah has also reported on the "Nuclear Train Wreck."

As Tom has described it: the reactor pressure vessel (RPV) for the chronically delayed Vogtle AP1000 reactor construction project near Waynesboro, Georgia sits stranded and seemingly unprotected in the port of Savannah. The special railroad car carrying the 300-ton vessel had unknown mechanical problems on December 15 on exiting the port.  The NRC has said that the vessel only got one-quarter mile before a sound was heard and the car stopped.  Plans by Westinghouse and Southern Company to move the vessel are unknown. It is also unknown if the railroad car can be repaired and used or if the railroad company which owns the line is concerned that the rail car might break down again on its line in an in accessible place.  Meanwhile, the apparently unguarded reactor might be subject to sabotage and sits in apparent violation of NRC quality assurance and "administrative control" regulations.

In Feb. 2010, President Obama himself announced the award of $8.3 billion in federal loan guarantees for the two proposed new AP1000s at Vogtle, GA. However, due to the nuclear utilities' reluctance to risk any of their own "skin in the game," the offer has yet to be finalized, nearly three years later!

Update on January 22, 2013 by admin

Photo by Tom Clements, Alliance for Nuclear Accountability (ANA).In a Jan. 22nd update entitled 'Vogtle Nuclear Reactor Still Stranded in Savannah; Pouring of “Nuclear Concrete” for Reactor’s Basemat Delayed Yet Again as Embarrassment and Costs Mount,' Tom Clements of Alliance for Nuclear Accountability gives the latest on the failed shipment of an AP-1000 reactor pressure vessel (RPV) from the Port of Savannah, GA bound for the Vogtle nuclear power plant in Georgia. This includes photos taken by Tom on Jan. 19th (see photo, left). Remarkably, not only Southern Co., but also Westinghouse and even the Korean manufacturer of the RPV have remained silent about the failed shipment, the condition of the RPV, and plans for next steps.

Meanwhile, not only Vogtle 3 & 4, but also the proposed new AP1000 at Summer nuclear power plant in South Carolina, have made LARs (License Amendment Requests) due to difficulties encountered in the pouring of nuclear-grade concrete for the base mat under the reactors and containments themselves. The consequent delays, and hence cost overruns, associated with all these ongoing problems could well be substantial.

As Tom Clements of ANA wrote regarding the photo (above, left): 'Photo taken on January 19 of close-up of Schnabel rail car with Vogtle "reactor pressure vessel"  hidden by a tarp.  The 300-ton reactor vessel was manufactured by Doosan in Korea and shipped through the Panama Canal to Savannah.  More photos are linked at [http://aikenleader.villagesoup.com/p/vogtle-nuclear-reactor-still-stranded-in-savannah-pouring-of-nuclear-concrete-for-reactor-s-basema/951066], which also includes a link to the January 14 article which has more photos.  How long will this embarrassing and potentially costly situation continue?  It's time for Westinghouse and Southern Company to come clean about the reactor shipment but will the companies, which are profiting due to an unjust Georgia law which forces rate payers to pay in advance for the Vogtle AP1000 project, continue their perplexing silence?  It is believed that South Carolina Electric & Gas (SCE&G) has a similar Schnabel rail car, owned by Westinghouse, at its disposal in the port of Charleston, where components for the V.C. Summer AP1000 are received.  Given what has happened with the Vogtle reactor shipment, will problems develop if a similar shipment is ever undertaken from Charleston to SCE&G's V.C. Summer site near Jenkinsville, South Carolina?'

Forbes: "the nuclear renaissance may be largely over before it started"

"Burning Money" image by Gene Case, Avenging AngelsPeter Kelly-Detwiler, Contributor to Forbes, has published an op-ed entitled "New Centralized Nuclear Plants: Still an Investment Worth Making?" He begins the piece:

"Just a few years ago, the US nuclear renaissance seemed at hand.  It probably shouldn’t have been.  Cost overruns from Finland to France to the US were already becoming manifest, government guarantees were in doubt, and shale gas drillers were beginning to punch holes into the ground with abandon." (emphasis added)

He concludes that "the nuclear renaissance may be largely over before it started," with not only the vast majority of proposed new reactors in the U.S. being cancelled, but even paid-off old reactors like Kewaunee in Wisconsin being permanently shutdown due to crushing economics -- such as the expense of major, vitally needed safety repairs at the 40-year old reactor.

Kelly-Detwiler cites the "takes too long," "costs too much," and "bet-the-farm" nature of nuclear power for the "failure to launch" of the nuclear relapse.

Regarding that last point, Kelly-Detwiler writes:

'So it appears that the nuclear renaissance may be largely over before it started.  And yet, many projects have not yet been canceled, with utilities and ratepayers accepting ever more risk in order to rescue sunk costs. In many cases, these costs have soared or will soar into the billions. As risk management expert Russell Walker of the Kellogg School of Management is quoted as saying in the Tampa Bay Times “When the stakes get higher, it gets harder for organizations to walk away…this happens a lot.  It’s the same problem a gambler has: If I play a little longer, it’ll come around.” '

However, he points out that the only proposed new reactors that seem to be moving ahead are those privileged by Construction Work in Progress (CWIP) funding. He writes:

'In Georgia, Vogtle Units 3 and 4 (owned jointly by a number of utilities, including Georgia Power) appear in somewhat better shape, but issues have cropped up there as well.  Customers currently pay $10 per month in advance to cover financing associated with the two 1,117 MW units.  Georgia Power is allowed by legislation to recover $1.7 bn in financing costs of its estimated $6.1 bn portion of the $14 bn plant during the construction period.  However, there have already been some cost problems, and Georgia Power is disputing its responsibility to pay $425 million of overruns resulting from delays in licensing approvals.  Total cost excesses to all partners total $875 mn.  The two units were expected to come online in 2016 and 2017, but in a Georgia PSC meeting in December, an independent monitor noted that expected delays of fifteen months are largely as a result of poor paperwork related to stringent design rules and quality assurance.  Those delays will likely continue to cost more money...

With low natural gas prices, efficient combined cycled turbines, more efficient renewables and a host of more efficient end-use technologies, that’s a bet fewer and fewer seem wiling to take.  Unfortunately for ratepayers at some utilities, they are at the table whether they like it or not…' (emphasis added)

If the op-ed's title is meant to imply that so-called small modular reactors might still save the day for the retreating nuclear power industry, it must be pointed out that the supposed justification for giant-sized proposed new reactors (such as the AP1000, at 1,100 MWe; the ESBWR at 1,500 MWe; the EPR at 1,600 MWe; etc.) was "economies of scale." Since small modular reactors represent the opposite end of the spectrum, it stands to reason these would be even more expensive than their super-sized, failed siblings.

In a classic February 14, 1985 piece entitled “Nuclear Follies,” Forbes wrote: 

"The failure of the U.S. nuclear power program ranks as the largest managerial disaster in business history, a disaster on a monumental scale. The utility industry has already invested $125 billion in nuclear power, with an additional $140 billion to come before the decade is out, and only the blind, or the biased, can now think that the money has been well spent. It is a defeat for the U.S. consumer and for the competitiveness of U.S. industry, for the utilities that undertook the program and for the private enterprise system that made it possible.”