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Centralized Storage

With the scientifically unsound proposed Yucca Mountain radioactive waste dump now canceled, the danger of "interim" storage threatens. This means that radioactive waste could be "temporarily" parked in open air lots, vulnerable to accident and attack, while a new repository site is sought.

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Entries by admin (702)

Friday
Oct232020

Beyond Nuclear's 19th set of public comments, re: Docket ID NRC-2016-0231, and report number NUREG-2239, NRC's ISP/WCS CISF DEIS, re: Risk of De Facto Permanent, Surface Storage, Parking Lot Dump

Submitted via: <WCS_CISF_EIS@nrc.gov>

Dear NRC Staff,

We submit these comments on behalf of our members and supporters, not only in New Mexico and Texas, near the targeted ISP/WCS CISF site, but across both of these states, and the rest of the country, along road, rail, and waterway routes that would be used for high risk, highly radioactive waste shipments to ISP/WCS's CISF, as well as to Yucca Mountain, Nevada, on Western Shoshone land -- wrongly and illegally assumed by ISP/WCS, as well as by NRC, to someday (or some decade, or some century) become a permanent disposal repository. This unnecessarily repeated, multiple legged, cross-continental transport of highly radioactive waste, is another significant aspect of the EJ (Environmental Justice) burden associated with this ISP/WCS CISF scheme.

The following subject matter has gotten little to no attention in NRC's ISP/WCS CISF DEIS, a far cry from NEPA's legally binding "hard look" requirement:

Risk of De Facto Permanent, Surface Storage, Parking Lot Dump

What if ISP/WCS's so-called consolidated interim storage facility (CISF for short, supposed to operate for “only” 40 years, which is already a long time -- not "interim" or "temporary" -- in most people’s books!) becomes much longer term, or even de facto permanent?

What if future replacements for today’s U.S. Representative from extreme West Texas/Andrews County (currently the 11th U.S. congressional district of TX), and adjacent, U.S. congressional districts in NM and TX, decide enough is enough, and the high-level radioactive wastes need to leave, after having been there for decades, or even centuries? Those one or two or at most a handful of future U.S. Representatives from Southeastern NM, and nearby extreme West TX, would then face the daunting challenge of overcoming the inertia, or even active opposition, of the other 430+ Members of the U.S. House of Representatives, who might be just fine with the high-level radioactive wastes staying at ISP/WCS's CISF forevermore (it’s not in their congressional district, after all!) – which is how long they will remain hazardous by the way.

In 2008, under court order, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency acknowledged that commercial irradiated nuclear fuel remains hazardous for a million years into the future. This is actually an underestimate. Take Iodine-129, as but one example. Its half-life is 15.7 million years. It will remain hazardous for at least ten half-lives, or 157 million years. To be safer/more conservative, the hazardous persistence should be considered for 20 half-lives, or in the case of I-219, 314 million years. I-129 is in high-level radioactive waste, including commercial irradiated nuclear fuel, too.

A 2013 U.S. Senate bill – forerunner to current versions of the legislation in Congress – added to the risks of consolidated "interim" storage facilities becoming de facto permanent, surface storage, parking lot dumps, by stating a preference for co-location of pilot consolidated interim storage facilities for "priority" irradiated nuclear fuel, alongside full-scale, lesser priority consolidated interim storage facilities, and even the permanent repository (that is, burial dump).

Also, the waiver of, or doing away with, any connection or "linkage" between development of centralized or consolidated interim storage facilities, and progress toward opening a repository, only increases the risk that supposedly "temporarily" (interim) stored highly radioactive wastes will simply be allowed to remain in centralized, or consolidated, so-called “interim,” surface storage facilities, indefinitely into the future. In other words, they could become de facto permanent, surface storage, parking lot dumps.

U.S. Senator Jeff Bingaman (D-NM), Chairman of the Energy and Natural Resources Committee, warned against this de-linkage in 2012. In fact, the requirement for a permanent disposal repository being opened and operating was, and still is, essential and foundational in the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, as Amended, the benchmark law on commercial irradiated nuclear fuel management for the past four decades. This was, and still is, a safeguard against consolidated interim storage facilities from becoming de facto permanent surface “disposal” sites, or parking lot dumps.

Note that the linkage requires an operating repository, not just a nearly licensed one, nor just a proposed one by someone, for someday, somewhere, some way. Remarkably, current DOE projections for the opening of the country's first permanent burial dump are not until the year 2048, 28 years from now, although they still don’t know who will make it happen, where, nor how! There is every possibility that even this 2048 repository opening date is overly optimistic.

And it must be remembered that by spring 2010, this country already needed a second repository, even though it is very far from having it's first one yet. The George W. Bush administration DOE, in late 2008, published its Report on the Need for a Second Repository, that officially acknowledged that the Yucca Mountain dump's legal capacity limit of 63,000 metric tons of commercial irradiated nuclear fuel would already be surpassed by the quantity of commercial irradiated nuclear fuel generated in this country, as early as spring 2010. The commercial irradiated nuclear fuel generated since 2010 is excess to Yucca's capacity limit, and will require a second repository somewhere else. By the terms of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, as Amended, this second repository must be in the eastern U.S., to fulfill the principle of regional equity. After all, 90% of reactors and the irradiated nuclear fuel they have generated, are located in the eastern half of the country. 75% are located east of the Mississippi River.

But since the mid-1980s, the only targeted sites for the first repository have been in the West -- Deaf Smith County, Texas; Hanford, Washington; and Yucca Mountain, Nevada. Since 1987's Nuclear Waste Policy Amendments Act (much more commonly known as the "Screw Nevada" Act), the sole target has been Western Shoshone land, at Yucca Mountain in Nevada.

But of course, the Yucca Mountain dump will never open, for a long list of reasons. Please see my "Stringent Criteria" list, also submitted as comments in this proceeding, for the reasons why the Yucca dump never will, and never should, open.

So in that sense, our country currently needs two permanent repositories, even though we don't even have the first one yet. It is dubious even the first repository will be open by 2048, let alone two repositories will be opened by that date. Thus, the idea that ISP/WCS's CISF is "temporary" or "interim" is very dubious. It will be very long-term storage, and perhaps even de facto permanent, risking becoming a surface storage parking lot dump. Actually, when surface "storage" becomes de facto permanent, that would make it surface disposal.

2048 will be 106 years after Enrico Fermi generated the first cupful of high-level radioactive waste of the Atomic Age, in his Chicago Pile-1 at the University of Chicago squash court under the Stagg Field football stadium, on Dec. 2, 1942 as part of the Manhattan Project race for the atomic bomb. 2048 is 91 years after the first civilian, or commercial, irradiated nuclear fuel was generated, at the Shippingport atomic reactor, northwest of Pittsburgh, in the Beaver Valley of PA, very near the OH state line. Such already long-term storage, and such remarkable delays in high-level radioactive waste management and disposal, are another red flag, cautionary tale, and warning about ISP/WCS’s consolidated interim storage facility, so-called, instead becoming a very long-term, indefinite, or even de facto permanent, surface storage, parking lot dump.

A major red flag, warning that "interim storage" at ISP/WCS could easily instead become permanent surface dispsosal, was raised on March 26, 2019. On that day, President Trump's first Energy Secretary, former Texas governor Rick Perry (who served as Energy Secretary from till), stated in congressional testimony that not only did he, but also the people of Andrews County, Texas, welcomed permanent storage (disposal) at the ISP/CISF. Of course, the large-scale opposition to ISP/WCS's CISF scheme, as manifested during NRC's environmental scoping phase in years past, and now in the DEIS phase -- including many comments made, importantly, by Andrews County residents themselves -- has clearly shown that the public do not want it. In fact, "WE DON'T WANT IT!" placards emblazoned with radiation hazard symbols have become an iconic symbol of the resistance movement in West TX and beyond.

But Rick Perry wants it. And why wouldn't he? The former owner of WCS, Harold Simmons, was the major campaign contributor to Rick Perry, during several runs for TX governor, and even a couple runs for president. WCS's largesse in Rick Perry's direction is documented in this article I wrote on Jan. 9, 2017 in Counterpunch, entitled "Radioactive Waste is Good for You, or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love Rick Perry as Energy Secretary."

To document Rick Perry's March 26, 2019 embrace of permanent storage (surface dispoal) at ISP/WCS's CISF, I have reproduced my Beyond Nuclear website post from that day, here below:

{Energy Secretary Rick Perry says he, and Andrews County, Texas, are fine with "interim storage" becoming permanent!

Beyond Nuclear, and its many allies opposed to CISFs (consolidated interim storage facilities) for highly radioactive irradiated nuclear fuel, have warned for many years, that "temporary" could easily become de facto permanent surface storage, if they are ever opened, as at Waste Control Specialists, in Andrews County, west Texas, and/or Holtec International/Eddy-Lea Energy Alliance, in southeast New Mexico.

But now Trump's U.S. Energy Secretary Rick Perry -- the former governor of Texas -- has come right out and admitted it. In response to U.S. Rep. Mike Simpson (R-ID) at a U.S. House appropriations subcommittee hearing on March 26, 2019, Perry said he, as well as the host county targeted -- Andrews, in west Texas -- are fine with so-called "consolidated interim storage" at Waste Control Specialists, LLC turning into de facto permanent surface storage.

Watch the YouTube video, from the 23 minute 30 second mark, to the 29 minute 30 second mark, here.

(See below for a transcript of the exchange, typed up by Michael Keegan of Don't Waste Michigan.)

Energy Secretary Perry seems unaware of the 40,000+ public comments -- a record-breaking number on the subject matter of high-level radioactive waste (HLRW) -- submitted to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) late last year, opposed to the CISF targeted at WCS (recently renamed ISP, short for Interim Storage Partners). A fair number of those comments came from residents of Andrews County itself -- and significantly, Hispanic residents of Andrews County.

Energy Secretary Perry likewise seems unaware of his own agency's warning in the past, that high-level radioactive waste, abandoned at the surface of the Earth, will leak catastrophically over a long enough period of time -- guaranteed -- and hence the need for safe, sound, deep geological disposal.

(But then again, at a presidential campaign debate, Perry began to say he would abolish the DOE, only he could not remember the agency's name! "Whoops," he gulped. But when Trump tapped him to be his Energy Secretary, Perry was only too happy to oblige, any such thoughts of agency abolition forgotten. It can be argued, though, that Perry is doing a "heckuva job" (to borrow a George W. Bushism, from his administration's deadly Hurricane Katrina fiasco) at running the agency into the ground, which may be just as "good" as abolishing it outright?!

It should also be noted that the founder of the WCS "low-level" radioactive waste dump, Dallas billionaire Harold Simmons, nicknamed "The King of Superfund Sites," was also Rick Perry's biggest single campaign contributor, in Perry's successful runs for TX governor, as well as his failed runs for president. Perry has been a big supporter of CISFs, in TX and NM, ever since.)

The Department of Energy issued its warning in the context of the proposed national dump-site at Yucca Mountain, on Western Shoshone Indian land in Nevada. That is, DOE was trying to panic the public, that if they didn't support the DOE's and nuclear power industry's coveted Yucca dump, right away, then catastrophe would unfold over time, as at nuclear power plant sites near them.

However, what DOE has never been willing to admit is that Yucca itself is scientifically unsuitable (and lacks consent-based siting; and violates the Treaty of Ruby Valley of 1863, the highest law of the land, equal in stature to the U.S. Constitution itself; and is an EJ violation, as the Western Shoshone and Nevadans downwind and downstream of nuclear weapons testing have already suffered severe exposure to radioactive fallout), and would leak massively into the environment over time, defeating the purpose of deep geological disposal!

Because Yucca is unacceptable as a dump-site (for all of the reasons listed above, and many more), it cannot be looked to as a place to off-load the burden of CISFs. Energy Secretary Perry is right -- once high-level radioactive waste is parked at the surface in Texas (and/or New Mexico for that matter), it will never leave again. It will become de facto permanent storage, at the surface. In that sense, a forever parking lot dump, a disposal dump. Just what DOE itself warned would leak hazardous radioactivity, catastrophcally into the environment, over a long enough period of time.

It is high time for the American people to just say no to the Yucca dump, as well as CISFs in TX and NM. Contact your U.S. Rep. and both your U.S. Senators, and tell them that! After all, the HLRWs would have to travel through most states, many major cities, and the vast majority of U.S. congressional districts (by train, truck, and/or barge, at very high risk) to get to NM, NV, and/or TX -- likely including your town, or one near you!

House Committee on Appropriations March 26, 2019.

Unofficial Transcript - Keyed in by Michael J. Keegan

At 23:30 minutes

[Mr. Simpson Ranking Member]

Thank you and to follow on that you were constrained in this budget requests by the law which is the caps and so consequently given in this year's not last year's funding.  I have no idea what this year's level of budget will be. I understand the restraints on our 302 B on this commit but I am going to be trying to put this budget together, which are the caps which is what you have to do.

Let me start out by saying I am pleased that the department has continued to request funds to reopen Yucca Mountain - the licensing process anyway.  We need to, we need to move forward with a permanent repository without further delay.  Could you tell us a little about what the costs of delaying, Yucca Mountain being delayed, about the tax dollars being spent as well as the negative impacts such as...  How willing are communities going to be accepting interim storage if there is not a permanent repository and no prospects of a permanent  repository and they could become a de facto permanent repository.

Will communities be willing to accept wastes for Yucca Mountain or the wastes from the sites that should be going to Yucca Mountain. (emphasis added)

[Secretary Department of Energy Rick Perry:]

Thank you, we worked closely during my tenure with your office on this issue.  I remind the members, I remind the public that this is the law and I held up my hand and committed to upholding the law, the laws of this Country, when I took this role.

So understanding that this is the law, and our budget asks for those line items that will allow us to maintain that we are required to conduct by Congress,  and also for the regulatory commission to  the NRC their funding that is what this budget request is for.   Um there is also request in there for Interim storage.   So, because if we don't do this in some form or fashion,  and  we've got 38  permanent  repositories and it is in every one of your  states, I don't know if it is everyone's district or not, it certainly is in everyone's... Madam Chair, I made a little map,  and that's the 39 states it's deposited.  I think that this is where high level waste is now deposited, that is  the question for us as citizens, and you as our elected officials.  Is this going to be our solution?   I certainly hope that is not the case.

We are going to be open to any of the ideas to the scientists that we have at our agencies at our labs may find, we will work with Congress any way we can to find a solution. We've been  worked with WIPP out in NM to come up with some additional volumes, and the state agreed to that this last year so we can take more int that site . 

There is also a site in West Texas in Andrews County that  is also legitimate site , obviously Yucca continues to be (cut off by Simpson)

[Congressman Simpson]:   Let me ask you even the site in Texas do you think that they'd be willing to accept permanent storage? (emphasis added)

[Rick Perry]:  I am going to leave that up to current governor to answer for you directly.  The previous governor was very supportive of it being a permanent site, there was a clear effort to make ... and the people of Andrews the citizens of Andrew County very very supportive. We had a low level nuclear committee when I was the governor.  Again I don't know. (emphasis added)

I am not going to speak for the current governor or legislators but for 14 years prior to those individuals coming on there. So you know, my point is we've got to find a solution, 39 states as final repositories is not a, is not an appropriate solution to this.

Thank you.

Oh and you asked me, I'm sorry you asked me specifically the costs.

The cost is $2 million dollars a day, $2 million dollars is the cost of keeping the process in 38 states, is the cost per day to keep in 38 states, the cost has been $8 billion since 2010.

At 29:30 [Congressman Marcy Kaptur]: - Thank you Mr. Simpson now on to Congresswoman Debbie Wasserman Shultz...}

Please address and rectify your woefully inadequate "hard look" under NEPA, re: this health-, safety-, and environmentally-significant, as well as legally-binding, subject matter above.

And please acknowledge your receipt of these comments, and confirm their inclusion as official public comments in the record of this docket.

Thank you.

Sincerely,

Kay Drey, President, Board of Directors, Beyond Nuclear

and

Kevin Kamps, Radioactive Waste Specialist, Beyond Nuclear

Thursday
Oct222020

Beyond Nuclear's 18th set of public comments, re: Docket ID NRC-2016-0231, and report number NUREG-2239, NRC's ISP/WCS CISF DEIS, re: Risks of Loss of Institutional Control if De Facto Permanent, Surface Storage, Parking Lot Dumps are Abandoned, Containers Fail, and Release Catastrophic Amounts of Hazardous Radioactivity into the Environment

Submitted via: <WCS_CISF_EIS@nrc.gov>
 

Dear NRC Staff,

We submit these comments on behalf of our members and supporters, not only in New Mexico and Texas, near the targeted ISP/WCS CISF site, but across both of these states, and the rest of the country, along road, rail, and waterway routes that would be used for high risk, highly radioactive waste shipments to ISP/WCS's CISF, as well as to Yucca Mountain, Nevada, on Western Shoshone land -- wrongly and illegally assumed by ISP/WCS, as well as by NRC, to someday (or some decade, or some century) become a permanent disposal repository. This unnecessarily repeated, multiple legged, cross-continental transport of highly radioactive waste, is another significant aspect of the EJ (Environmental Justice) burden associated with this ISP/WCS CISF scheme.

The following subject matter has gotten little to no attention in NRC's ISP/WCS CISF DEIS, a far cry from NEPA's legally binding "hard look" requirement:

Risks of Loss of Institutional Control if De Facto Permanent, Surface Storage, Parking Lot Dumps are Abandoned, Containers Fail, and Release Catastrophic Amounts of Hazardous Radioactivity into the Environment

DOE (the U.S. Department of Energy) has warned in its EIS (Environmental Impact Statement) on the proposed Yucca Mountain, Nevada national burial dump, that loss of institutional control would eventually prove catastrophic. Entropy means that things fall apart, over long enough periods of time. The Second Law of Thermodynamics holds that disorder increases with time. DOE was focused on this happening at nuclear power plant sites, if irradiated nuclear fuel was abandoned there forever. But the same is true here. If institutional control is eventually lost at the ISP/WCS CISF (de facto permanent, surface storage, high-level radioactive waste parking lot dump), the containers will eventually fail, and catastrophically release their hazardous, high-level radioactive waste contents into the living environment. Persistently hazardous, and even deadly, radioactive fallout would then flow with the winds and the waters, downwind and downstream, up the food chain, and down the generations, over greater and greater distances over longer and longer time periods. Remember, high-level radioactive waste remains hazardous, even deadly, for at least a million years into the future. This was acknowledged by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in 2008, under court order in the Yucca Mountain proceeding. On July 9, 2004, the second highest court in the land, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, ruled that EPA's cutting off of regulations at Yucca Mountain, just 10,000 years post-burial, was illegal, a violation of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, as Amended. The court ordered EPA back to the drawing board, to correct its illegal Yucca Mountain regulations. This led to EPA's 2008 regulatory revision, recognizing a million years of hazard. The 2002 lawsuit, which was consolidated with a dozen additional lawsuits in NEI v. EPA, was brought by NIRS (Nuclear Information and Resource Service), Public Citizen, Citizens Action Coalition of Indiana, Nevada Nuclear Waste Task Force, and Citizen Alert of Nevada. The environmental coalition, whose legal counsel was Geoff Fettus of Natural Resources Defense Council, was joined in the lawsuit by the State of Nevada, another leading opponent of the Yucca dump scheme.

Actually, even acknowledging a million years of hazard is a lowball estimate. Take the artificial (that is, manmade) radioactive isotope Iodine-129. It has a half-life of 15.7 million years, thus at least 157 million years of associated hazard, and perhaps even 314 million years.

Such impacts would extend to the immediately adjacent surface environment, and very likely even nearby, underlying aquifers, such as the Ogallala Aquifer -- which NRC acknowledged in its DEIS call-in verbal comment sessions, is located as little as one mile from the targeted CISF site. Other aquifers nearby are also in harm's way.

And, especially considering the direction of surface water flow, but also prevailing weather patterns and winds, such radioactivity releases from ISP's CISF would certainy impact New Mexico, just 0.37 miles downwind and downstream. An official from the New Mexico Environment Department confirmed this during one of NRC's verbal comment call-in sessions re: the ISP CISF DEIS.

Thus, the Ogallala can be considered downwind and downstream, over a long enough time period, from both ISP's, but also Holtec's, CISFs (just because Holtec's CISF is further from the Ogallala than ISP's, does not mean that over long enough periods of time, radioactive pollution escaping from Holtec's CISF in NM could not also reach the Ogallala, to contaminate it).

Additional aquifers directly under or adjacent to ISP's CISF are simply in harm's way nearer term, more directly.

Also, downwind or downstream surface level radioactive fallout from both ISP's and Holtec's CISFs could eventually find its way into the Ogallala, through natural flow paths (blowing with the winds, flowing with the rains and surface waters, deposition onto and into soil, downward flow to aquifers). The Ogallala, North America’s largest aquifer, and one of the largest on Earth, provides essential drinking and irrigation water for millions in Texas, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Kansas, Colorado, Nebraska, Wyoming, and South Dakota. As the water protectors at the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe reservation say in Lakota language on the Missouri River in North Dakota, Mni Wiconi, Water Is Life. This was made very clear by drinking water contamination disasters, in just the past decade, in such widespread locations as: Flint, Michigan (Flint River lead poisoning); Charleston, West Virginia (toxic chemical spill into the Elk and Kanawha Rivers); the Animas, San Juan, and Colorado Rivers in Colorado, New Mexico and Utah, and further downstream (EPA-caused toxic wastewater release from an abandoned gold mine); Toledo, Ohio (Lake Erie toxic blue green algae contamination); Marshall, Michigan (Enbridge of Canada toxic tar sands crude oil spill into Talmadge Creek and the Kalamazoo River, the largest inland oil spill in U.S. history) -- to name but a small number of examples. A radioactive release into or contamination of the Ogallala would be similarly catastrophic. As mentioned, radioactive releases into surface waters and groundwaters nearer by the ISP/WCS and/or Holtec/ELEA CISFs would simply take place sooner, rather than later, as compared to the Ogallala itself, given distances and radioactivity flow with the elements.

Making these risks all the worse, NRC has allowed a quality assurance (QA) failure crisis to persist in the U.S. nuclear power industry for years and decades. These QA failures extend not only to on-site storage casks at reactors, but also to the shipping cask and away-from-reactor storage cask realm, directly relevant to both Holtec's CISF in NM, but also ISP's CISF in TX. The inner canisters of various cask models are identical, whether used for on-site storage at reactors, transport, or away-from-reactor storage at the CISFs.

Industry and even NRC whistle-blowers called attention to these QA failure risks 20 long years ago, yet little to nothing has been done to correct them since. Industry whistle-blower Oscar Shirani questioned the structural integrity of NRC-approved and industry-utilized storage casks sitting still, let alone traveling 60 miles per hour or faster on the railways. Shirani was backed up in his allegations by NRC Midwest Region (Region III) dry cask storage inspector, Dr. Ross Landsman, who warned “The NRC should stop the production of the casks, but they do not have the chutzpah to do it. This is the kind of thinking that causes space shuttles to hit the ground.” Shirani and Landsman were commenting directly upon Holtec container QA violations, but the widespread QA violations with Holtec containers begs the question, do similar QA violations afflict cask models that would be used at ISP's CISF?

Such QA failures, shoddy design, and shoddy fabrication, re: the storage casks and canisters, means that their eventual failure, and release of their deadly hazardous high-level radioactive waste contents, will only happen all the sooner.

Although Shirani and Landsman’s revelations were about Holtec casks, NRC’s incompetence at best, or even collusion with industry, when it comes to cask QA violations, extends to other cask models and designs, including NAC (Nuclear Assurance Corporation) and Areva (Orano) casks to be used at ISP's CISF at WCS, TX, just 40 miles from Holtec's in NM. The QA violation crisis also extends to many, most, or all other dry cask models, such as VSC-24s (Ventilated Storage Casks), as but one additional example, as deployed at Palisades in MI, Point Beach in WI, and Arkansas Nuclear One. Holtec has bragged in its license application for its CISF in NM that it could accommodate any and all cask model designs approved by NRC, with no exceptions. NAC challenged such claims by Holtec with an intervention in the NRC ASLB Holtec CISF licensing proceeding. But we mention the widespread QA violations, because whether Holtec containers, or other designs, the loss of institutional control and container breach risk still applies, both at Holtec's CISF in NM, and also at ISP's CISF in TX.

Nuclear Assurance Corporation (NAC) container – certainly to be used at ISP's CISF at WCS, TX, but also potentially to be used at Holtec's CISF in NM -- QA failures are of specific concern. In autumn 2016, shoddy welding by NAC led to the bottom literally falling out of an irradiated nuclear fuel assembly transfer caddy, allowing the assembly to strike the bottom of the storage pool at Chalk River Nuclear Labs in Ontario, Canada. Such bad welding calls into question the welds on NAC storage and transport containers as well, such as those to be used by ISP's CISF in TX.

In his 1987 book "The Next Nuclear Gamble," Dr. Marvin Resnikoff (who serves as an expert witness for Sierra Club in this ISP CISF licensing proceeding) documented NAC transport containers bowing out of shape, causing irradiated nuclear fuel assemblies to get stuck within them. In an incident at a California atomic plant, also documented in Resnikoff's book, a NAC transport container disgorged highly radioactively contaminated water, which then spilled onto the ground, splashed on workers, and otherwise escaped control. These are additional pieces of evidence that NAC containers, like Holtec's, suffer serious, safety-significant QA and technical specification violations.

At Davis-Besse atomic reactor on the Great Lakes shoreline near Toledo, Ohio, an Areva (now called Orano; previously called Cogema) design Transnuclear NUHOMS storage cask was loaded with irradiated nuclear fuel, despite local environmental interventions (including by Don't Waste Michigan, represented by legal counsel Terry Lodge of Toledo, OH) to stop it, after it was revealed the walls of inner canisters holding the high-level radioactive waste were ground too thin, violating technical specifications. But violations of technical specifications for the design and manufacture of casks in the U.S. are as rampant as QA violations. NRC looks the other way in both cases.

In fact, faulty welding was a major example of the Holtec container QA violations cited by Shirani and Landsman. See a 2004 summary of Shirani and Landsman's allegations, including re: faulty welding, posted online at this link here. Again, the question is begged: if Holtec's QA violations are so widespread, does a similar problem exist with container models that would be deployed by ISP at its CISF in TX?

Please address and rectify your woefully inadequate "hard look" under NEPA, re: this health-, safety-, and environmentally-significant, as well as legally-binding, subject matter above.

And please acknowledge your receipt of these comments, and confirm their inclusion as official public comments in the record of this docket.

Thank you.

Sincerely,

Kay Drey, President, Board of Directors, Beyond Nuclear

and

Kevin Kamps, Radioactive Waste Specialist, Beyond Nuclear

Thursday
Oct222020

Beyond Nuclear's 17th set of public comments, re: Docket ID NRC-2016-0231, and report number NUREG-2239, NRC's ISP/WCS CISF DEIS, re: Mobile Chernobyl shipping risks

Submitted via: <WCS_CISF_EIS@nrc.gov>
 

Dear NRC Staff,

We submit these comments on behalf of our members and supporters, not only in New Mexico and Texas, near the targeted ISP/WCS CISF site, but across both of these states, and the rest of the country, along road, rail, and waterway routes that would be used for high risk, highly radioactive waste shipments to ISP/WCS's CISF, as well as to Yucca Mountain, Nevada, on Western Shoshone land -- wrongly and illegally assumed by ISP/WCS, as well as by NRC, to someday (or some decade, or some century) become a permanent disposal repository. This unnecessarily repeated, multiple legged, cross-continental transport of highly radioactive waste, is another significant aspect of the EJ (Environmental Justice) burden associated with this ISP/WCS CISF scheme.

The following subject matter has gotten little to no attention in NRC's ISP/WCS CISF DEIS, a far cry from NEPA's legally binding "hard look" requirement: Mobile Chernobyl shipping risks.

Mobile Chernobyl shipping risks

Southeastern New Mexico and extreme West Texas have the dubious distinction that every single train car load of high-level radioactive waste will pass through on its way into (and, if it ever leaves, out of) ISP's CISF at WCS, TX, 0.37 miles from the border of NM. But transport impacts, to import 40,000 metric tons of irradiated nuclear fuel, would extend across both New Mexico and Texas, and will also be felt nation-wide. In that sense, when it comes to radioactive waste transportation, we all live in Southeastern NM and extreme West TX.

In fact, ISP -- and NRC -- erroneously assume the irradiated nuclear fuel will leave extreme West TX, bound for a permanent dump-site on Western Shoshone land at Yucca Mountain, NV. If that were to happen (which it will not, for reasons given below), Southeastern NM and extreme West TX, as well as much of the northern tier of TX (including Dallas/Fort Worth), and much of Oklahoma (including Oklahoma City) would be hit coming and going.

This is shown by Figure 2.6-1, Transportation Routes, in ISP's Environmental Report, Rev. 2, Chapter 2, Page 2-78. (Incredibly, NRC's DEIS does not even include this woefully inadequate single transport routing map. In that sense, NRC's DEIS is even more woefully inadequate than ISP's ER!) It would be a Mobile Chernobyl double whammy. Eastern irradiated nuclear fuel would pass through these communities during the in-bound phase, to extreme West TX. Then, during the out-bound phase, going to NV, it would pass through these very same communities in NM, TX, and OK for a second time. This shows the nonsensical nature of CISFs, in the sense of doubling transport risks for communities in NM, TX, and OK for no good reason whatsoever.

A de facto permanent surface storage parking lot dump at ISP's WCS site in Andrews County, West Texas, very near Eunice, NM, would only increase safety risks. It would not decrease them. It would multiply transport risks, as it would only be temporary (supposedly). All that highly radioactive waste would have to move again, to a permanent burial site (yet to be identified – so that’s a big IF!). And that could be back in the same direction from which it came in the first place! If the permanent burial site is in the Eastern U.S., then many additional states would have seen irradiated nuclear fuel shipments coming (out to extreme West TX), and going (back East).

ISP and NRC’s assumption that the dump at Yucca Mountain, Nevada will open someday, to take the high-level radioactive waste away, is inappropriate. The vast majority of Nevadans has expressed its very adamant non-consent for 33 years now, and still vehemently oppose it. This is reflected by bipartisan resistance by elected officials, at both the state government level, as well as the U.S. congressional delegation level.

In addition, the Western Shoshone have clearly communicated their non-consent to being dumped on, for several decades now. A dump at Yucca Mountain would violate the "peace and friendship" Treaty of Ruby Valley of 1863, signed by the U.S. government with the Western Shoshone, the highest law of the land, equal in stature to the U.S. Constitution itself.

In addition, more than a thousand environmental, environmental justice, social justice, and public interest organizations, representing every state, oppose the Yucca dump, and have done so for 33 years. Here is a partial listing:

Over 50 National and 700 Regional/State/Local Grassroots Environmental Groups Publicly Opposed to the Yucca Mountain High-Level Radioactive Waste Dump.

<http://archives.nirs.us/radwaste/yucca/yuccaopponentslist.htm>

For these reasons, the Yucca dump will never happen. But, if ISP and NRC are assuming the Yucca dump will happen, they should then analyze the environmental, safety, and health impacts of CISF to Yucca dump transports. Any such analysis, as in NRC's DEIS, is woefully inadequate. Not a hard look, but hardly a look. This violates NEPA.

ISP and NRC’s assumption that another permanent burial dump will be opened, by someone, somewhere, someday, somehow, is also inappropriate. After all, the search for a national geologic repository has gone on since the 1950s, but has utterly failed. And DOE’s most recent estimate for the opening of the U.S.’s first repository is 2048, 28 years from now. Except they have no idea where that will be. It won't be Yucca Mountain. There is every likelihood that 2048 date will slip into the future as well, as all previous target dates have, since 1957.

The failed Private Fuel Storage, LLC parking lot dump targeted at the Skull Valley Goshutes Indian Reservation in Utah, likewise assumed the Yucca dump would open. They were, of course, incorrect.

So PFS’s “Plan B” was to “return to sender.” If 40,000 metric tons of irradiated nuclear fuel – the same amount of capacity that ISP has applied for – had been delivered to PFS, UT, what would that “return to sender” policy have looked like?

Maine Yankee was a PFS consortium member. 60 rail sized containers of irradiated nuclear fuel would have traveled 5,000 miles round trip, accomplishing absolutely nothing, other than exposing millions of people in numerous states to high-risk shipments, as well as "routine" or "incident-free" but still hazardous emissions of gamma and neutron radiation.

ISP also has a "start clean/stay clean" or "return to sender" policy for its CISF. This is outrageous. If problem casks arrive at ISP's CISF, ISP has said it would simply ship the problem cask back to the nuclear power plant site from whence it came. Shipping leaking, contaminated, damaged, defective, or otherwise problematic casks back across the country, right back through the same communities from which they passed in the first place, is absurd and dangerous. All this, so that ISP can avoid the expense and trouble of building a dry transfer system (DTS) at its CISF. Outrageously and absurdly, NRC has blessed ISP's "return to sender" policy. This, despite the agency relying on DTS's, in its Continued Spent Nuclear Fuel Storage Rule (Nuclear Waste Confidence Rule, or Nuke Waste Con Game), as the basis for claiming that indefinitely long away from reactor ISFSI (such as ISP's CISF) would be safe and sound, as a DTS would allow for the irradiated nuclear fuel in problem casks to be offloaded in brand new replacement casks. Well, not if the DTS is never built in the first place. ISP plans to build no DTS. NRC is letting them get away with this. ISP's and NRC's remarkably weak argument seems to be that if a DTS were ever required, it could simply be built later. But of course, this doesn't address the time and expense it takes. There could simply be no time to build a DTS during a fast-breaking container emergency at the CISF, not before large-scale releases of hazardous radioactivity had already occurred, harming not only CISF workers, but also area residents downwind, downstream, up the food chain, and down the generations.

Another version of this back-and-forth-across-the-country shipping nonsense is the fact that permanent burial sites could be located right back in the same direction from which the waste came in the first place. In fact, at one time, DOE was targeting two sites in Maine, seven sites in Vermont, and two sites in New Hampshire, for permanent burial dumps. (See Beyond Nuclear’s backgrounder, re: the NH targets, at: <http://static1.1.sqspcdn.com/static/f/356082/24115710/1487366549330/New_Hampshire_dump_final+draft.pdf?token=ZDgyvKfq8uxG4HPqWmvVvXBuwmY%3D>).

This game of high-risk, high-level radioactive waste musical chairs, or hot potato, on the roads, rails, and waterways, is unacceptable. It amounts to Radioactive Russian roulette. Multiplying transport risks for no good reason is wrong, dangerous, and makes no sense.

Holtec's Quality Assurance (QA) failures, mentioned in previous Beyond Nuclear comments in the Holtec CISF DEIS public comment proceeding, are very significant to shipping risks. And Holtec's widespread QA violations beg the question, are there widespread QA violations with the container models to be used at ISP's CISF, as well? Shipping containers plagued with QA violations could well be less capable of withstanding severe accidents (such as high-speed crashes, including into immovable objects, like bridge abutments; high-temperature, long-duration fires; deep, long-lasting underwater submersion; drops from tall heights, onto unyielding surfaces, such as bridge foundations, or spiked objects; or some combination of all those), as well as intentional attacks (such as with shaped charges, or anti-tank weapon systems – see below), or other powerful explosions or intense fires (such as explosive/flammable cargoes on passing trains, including, nowadays, crude oil “Bomb Trains,” as from the Bakken oil fields in North Dakota -- but of course, the Permian Basin has some of the most intense fossil fuel shipping by rail of anywhere in the world.).

Adding to these shipping risks, is the potential for barge shipments on surface waters. ISP's CISF is supposed to use "mostly rail" shipping containers -- which can also mean many barges (some two dozen or more U.S. reactors lack direct rail access, meaning barges on surface waters -- the Great Lakes, rivers, seacoasts -- could be used to haul the giant, very heavy rail-sized casks to the nearest rail head). Backgrounders (including more details on the high risks) on these various barge routes (including maps) were originally written for the Yucca dump scheme; however, ISP's CISF would very likely involve such barging, as well.

DOE’s Feb. 2002 Yucca Mountain Final Environmental Impact Statement gives a preview of barge shipments that could well be required to ship high-level radioactive waste to the Southwest and/or West. The following barge shipment routes were proposed under the Yucca Mountain plan:

(See NIRS fact-sheets on barge shipments of deadly high-level radioactive waste on waterways, by state, posted online September 28, 2004, at this link here.)

The NRC DEIS is largely to entirely devoid of any analysis of such barging transport risks.

(However, with something as simple as a rushed NRC rubber-stamp amendment, ISP could apply for, and quickly get, permission to truck in smaller-sized, "Legal Weight Truck" (LWT) casks to its extreme West TX CISF. This mix of trains/barges and trucks, would mean even more American communities would be exposed to Mobile Chernobyl risks. Of course, if barges are not used for ISP's rail sized casks, at nuclear power plant sites lacking direct rail access, then the only other option would be heavy-haul trucks. Heavy-haul trucking risks are also largely to entirely absent from NRC's DEIS, a violation of NEPA's hard look requirement.)

Dirty Bomb on Wheels security risks would also abound. See: <https://web.archive.org/web/20150908070611/http://www.nirs.org/factsheets/nirsfctshtdrycaskvulnerable.pdf>This was made clear by the test of an anti-tank missile against an (empty) irradiated nuclear fuel shipping cask at the U.S. Army’s Aberdeen Proving Ground in Maryland. The June 1998 test targeted a German CASTOR cask. While certified for storage-only in the U.S. (the cask model is deployed at Surry, VA), it is widely used for transport in Europe. CASTORs have thicker die cast iron walls, as compared to thinner walled steel casks used in the U.S., including the various models of casks to be used at ISP's CISF. That is, CASTORs are significantly more robust, more capable to withstand such an attack. However, even the CASTOR, "the Cadillac of shipping casks," as some have called it, was severely breached by the anti-tank missile. A hole as big around as a grapefruit or softball was blown clean through the side wall. Had irradiated nuclear fuel been inside, the hole would have created the pathway for release of disastrous amounts of hazardous radioactivity – all the more so, if an incendiary attack were combined with the explosive attack. In short, shipping containers were not designed, nor are they capable, to withstand such attacks. See:

<https://web.archive.org/web/20150908070611/http://www.nirs.org/factsheets/nirsfctshtdrycaskvulnerable.pdf>.

Please address and rectify your woefully inadequate "hard look" under NEPA, re: this health-, safety-, and environmentally-significant, as well as legally-binding, subject matter above.

And please acknowledge your receipt of these comments, and confirm their inclusion as official public comments in the record of this docket.

Thank you.

Sincerely,

Kay Drey, President, Board of Directors, Beyond Nuclear

and

Kevin Kamps, Radioactive Waste Specialist, Beyond Nuclear

Thursday
Oct222020

HELP STOP TX NUKE DUMP! Written comments due 11/3

Thanks to all who submitted verbal comments to NRC during the 4 call-in sessions between October 1-15, about the Draft Environmental Impact Statement for Interim Storage Partners' Consolidated Interim Storage Facility at Waste Control Specialists. Dump opponents outnumbered proponents 121-13!
Written comments are due by Tuesday, November 3. Individuals can submit written comments via Public Citizen, SEED Coalition, and/or NIRS webforms; you can also email individual comments to <WCS_CISF_EIS@nrc.gov>, using our written comments to help prepare your own. There is also an organizational comment letter; sign your group on by emailing <kevin@beyondnuclear.org> your name, title, group name, city, and state. Help stop environmental racism & thousands of Mobile Chernobyls nationwide!
Thursday
Oct152020

Nuclear Utility Refuses To Investigate Possible Damage at D.C. Cook; Similarities to Near-Accident in 2002

NEWS FROM BEYOND NUCLEAR

For immediate release, Thursday, October 15, 2020

 

Eighteen Reactor Penetration Welds Go Unscrutinized at D.C. Cook Nuclear Plant
Nuclear Utility Refuses to Investigate Possible Damage to Reactor Vessel; Similarities to Near-Accident In 2002


Please see the full press release, including links to additional documentation, and press contacts, here.