SolarWinds Hack Infected Critical Infrastructure, Including Power Industry

The companies involved used compromised software, but it’s not clear if hackers entered their networks. Finding out could be difficult.

As reported by The Intercept.

Warning from scholar on far right/white supremacist extremism about threats to attack nuclear facilities in order to cause mass casualty events

University of Chicago Professor Kathleen Belew, on C-SPAN's "Q&A," warns that far right, white supremacist extremists have threatened in the past to attack nuclear power plants in order to unleash catastrophic mass casualty events.

See the C-SPAN "Q&A" interview, here.

(Belew is referring to the domestic terrorist group, Atomwaffen Division. Atomwaffen means nuclear weapons in German. See the PBS Frontline special "Documenting Hate: New American Nazis," that aired on Nov. 20, 2018. It documents an apparently disrupted Atomwaffen Division plot to attack the Turkey Point nuclear power plant in southern Florida.)

To see how catastrophic such a domestic terrorist attack, causing an atomic reactor meltdown could be, in terms of casualties and property damage, see the CRAC-II chart, here.

It compiles the conclusions on casualties (peak early fatalities, or acute radiation poisoning deaths; peak radiation injuries; peak cancer deaths, or latent cancer fatalities), as well as property damage, as reported in CRAC-II.

CRAC-II is a 1982 report commissioned by NRC, and conducted by Sandia National Laboratory. CRAC-II is short for Calculation of Reactor Accident Consequences. It is also known as the Sandia Siting Study, or as NUREG/CR-2239.

As horrific as the CRAC-II figures are, Associated Press investigative journalist Jeff Donn warned in his 2011 series "Aging Nukes" after the Fukushima nuclear catastrophe in Japan had begun, that populations have soared around nuclear power plants lsince 1982, so casualties would be significantly higher today.

And adjusting for inflation alone, but not even accounting for the significant economic development in the downwind areas since 1982, property damage would now be significantly worse, when expressed as current year dollar figures.

And, as Fukushima has shown, domino effect meltdowns are possible at multi-reactor sites. That is, a successful domestic terrorist attack on a single reactor could lead to multiple meltdowns at the same site.

Irradiated nuclear fuel, whether stored in indoor wet storage pools, or even in dry cask arranged like bowling pins out in the open air/plain view, could also unleash radiological catastrohe, if successfully attacked.

Update on April 8, 2021 by admin

Re: Atomwaffen Division, the Washington Post reports "Neo-Nazi group leader who threatened journalists and activists plead guilty to hate crimes."

North Korea poised to launch large-scale cyberattacks, says new report

As reported by Anna Fifield in the Washington Post.

In late 2014, a major hack of the South Korean nuclear power industry was reported. The top suspect was the North Korean regime.

As but one of likely many such examples, in response to revelations of cyber-security vulnerabilities at its Palisades atomic reactor in Michigan, Entergy Nuclear has requested exemptions from cyber-security regulations. Dangerously, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission can be expected to rubber-stamp any such requests.

A Yemeni rebel claim highlights the risk of nuclear power in the Middle East

As reported by Ali Ahmad in the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists.

The article begins:

Earlier this week, Yemen’s Houthi rebel group claimed it had launched a missile at the Barakah nuclear power plant in the western region of Abu Dhabi, in retaliation for the Saudi-led blockade imposed on Yemen. Abu Dhabi is part of the United Arab Emirates (UAE), a member of the coalition that has been targeting the Houthis.

UAE officials immediately denied that the attack had taken place, and the Houthis have not provided any evidence to support their claim. However, regardless of the claim’s validity, and despite the lack of evidence, the incident is emblematic of the dangers of nuclear power in the Middle East. The UAE should take it very seriously. Even if this “attack” was merely a propaganda ploy, nuclear power facilities will always be potential targets for enemy states and non-state actors, including terrorist groups. In the Middle East, in particular, there is a history of attacks on nuclear sites during regional conflicts.

The article also warns that "rosy projections about nuclear power’s benefits gloss over the major security vulnerability the plant will create."

It continues:

The country’s National Emergency Crisis and Disaster Management Authority has said that "the UAE's air defense system is capable of dealing with any threats.” But downplaying the vulnerability of the site and the security risks of nuclear power could prove to be very costly. Nuclear power plants are natural targets in armed conflicts, particularly with the emergence of non-state actors such as Yemen’s Houthis.

The article concludes:

The issue of security is one of the reasons Israel has refrained from building nuclear power plants on its territory, although it has two small reactors, ostensibly for research. There is reason for caution, as the Middle East has a history of attacks on nuclear facilities, including one launched by Israel itself: In 1980, Iran bombed the under-construction Osirak nuclear reactor in Iraq but failed to destroy it; a year later, an attack by the Israeli air force succeeded in reducing the reactor to rubble. Likewise, Iraq repeatedly bombed the partially-completed Bushehr nuclear plant in Iran during the Iran-Iraq War in the 1980s.

Because these reactors were still under construction, the attacks did not lead to a release of radiation, but there have also been attacks on Israel’s Dimona reactor in the southern Negev desert. In 1991, Iraq fired Scud missiles at the reactor, but missed the target. Today, the facility is in missile range from Iran, Syria, and Hezbollah in Lebanon. Although the site is heavily protected, in 2012 the Israel Atomic Energy Commission announced that the reactor would be shut down should war break out, to minimize danger from attacks.

Given this history, and the potentially catastrophic consequences of a successful attack on a nuclear facility, the UAE and other Middle Eastern countries should seriously consider the risks when deciding whether to pursue their own forays into nuclear power.

See the full article. 

The article echos warning made by Bennett Ramberg in his 1984 book Nuclear Power Plants as Weapons for the Enemy: An Unrecognized Military Peril.

Ali Ahmad is a scholar-in-residence and director of the Energy Policy and Security Program at the Issam Fares Institute for Public Policy and International Affairs at the American University of Beirut. His work covers nuclear security, energy policy, and economics, with a focus on the Middle East. Prior to joining AUB, Ali was a research fellow at Princeton University's Program on Science and Global Security, where he studied prospects for nuclear energy in the Middle East and nuclear diplomacy with Iran.

U.A.E. Denies Yemen Rebels Fired Missile at Abu Dhabi Nuclear Plant

As reported by SHUAIB ALMOSAWA and THOMAS ERDBRINK in the New York Times.