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–new nuclear-reactor safety hazard?

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

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Thermal shock
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

Coolant water from accumulator flooding into older reactor vessels during an emergency will create abrupt temperature and pressure changes, say nuclear-safety critics, cracking steel walls or weld joints weakened by prolonged exposure to neutrons (inset). In this pressurized-water reactor, water is pumped through core and transfers heat to the steam generator.

Could cooling water rupture brittle reactor walls? Here are the facts

By EDWARD EDELSON
DRAWING BY EUGENE THOMPSON

"There is a high, increasing likelihood that someday soon, during a seemingly minor malfunction at any of a dozen or more nuclear plants around the United States, the steel vessel that houses the radioactive core is going to crack like a piece of glass. The result will be a core meltdown, the most serious kind of accident, which will injure many people, destroy the plant, and probably destroy the nuclear industry with it."—Demetrios L. Basdekas, *The New York Times*, March 29, 1982.

Basdekas, a reactor-safety engineer with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, continued his article to warn that radiation is making the metal reactor vessels at some nuclear plants brittle. As a result, he wrote, water used to flood and cool reactor cores in an emergency could cause a meltdown instead of preventing one. The cause: abrupt changes in reactor pressure and temperature—a condition called pressurized thermal shock—would crack brittle vessels, allowing emergency water to escape.

The safety engineer's "piece-of-glass" charge quickly focused attention on thermal shock:

- The NRC commissioners held a public meeting.
- Rep. Ed Markey of Massachusetts called a congressional hearing.

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• Work on what was supposed to be a definitive study of the thermal-shock issue was accelerated by the NRC.

And the kind of debate that has become quite familiar in recent years has predictably erupted. Electrical utilities, reactor manufacturers, and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission say that the pressurized-thermal-shock problem is well in hand and that the "piece-of-glass" charge is absurd. Critics say that the nuclear people are talking through their hats because there simply isn't enough information available to assess the danger of pressurized thermal shock.

I've recently talked to experts on both sides of the question. At the moment there are no pat answers. But information about the hazard of thermal shock is accumulating steadily. Here is what you need to know.

Pressurized thermal shock has been widely publicized only recently. But inklings of a problem emerged in the 1960s.

At one power-plant reactor, a worker peered into a video monitor and manipulated a robotic arm down into the radioactive water of a 40-foot-high reactor vessel. He slowly fished out a small basket hanging near the thick metal wall of the reactor. Inside the basket was a jumble of pencil-size steel bars, each alloyed with various metals and each bearing a V-shaped notch.

At a nearby test area, he carefully unloaded his irradiated catch behind shielded-glass windows. Deft maneuvers with another robotic arm positioned each steel bar under a wedge-shaped hammer. Then, as samples were cooled or heated, he pushed a button, and the hammer slammed into the notches.

This routine Charpy test (named for its developer) yielded expected results: At lower temperatures, where metals become brittle, samples broke easily. Higher temperatures—like those in your kitchen oven—made the steel more ductile. Heated steel samples absorbed more hammer energy before snapping.

But something unexpected occurred when the worker slammed his test hammer onto bars alloyed with tiny amounts of copper. The steel—even warmed—broke easily. He raised the temperature. Still the brittle bars snapped. Finally at about 300 degrees F, the bars became ductile instead of brittle. The presence of copper seemed to be producing strange results. Soon workers at other power and research reactors discovered the same unexpected embrittlement.

What puzzled everyone was the speedup of embrittlement because of the presence of copper, not the results of the standard Charpy tests on exposed metal samples. This technique—gradually changing metal temperatures and measuring how much hammer energy the metal can absorb without breaking—actually tests radiation damage. Radiation tends to make all metals brittle; irradiated metal must be raised to a higher temperature before it will become ductile. This shift in the transition temperature from brittle to ductile is a measure of radiation damage.

Nuclear researchers, aware of metal embrittlement, had earlier exposed samples to intense radiation. But the surge of reactor construction beginning in the 1960s found engineers without enough reliable data. To answer questions about long-term radiation effects on metal, baskets of Charpy samples had been positioned in early reactors.

> **"Copper was used to prevent rust. Someone probably got a prize for the suggestion"**

The principal cause of embrittlement was known to be neutrons, the atomic particles emitted by nuclear fission in the reactor core, colliding with metal in the reactor. "It's like billiards," says one expert. "Although metal atoms are much heavier than neutrons, when a high-energy neutron collides with a metal atom, the neutron forces the atom from its lattice—the geometric array of atoms."

The Charpy tests of the 1960s revealed that just a little copper in a steel alloy hastens embrittlement. Since that time, though, researchers have been uncertain why the presence of copper hastens radiation damage. Theodore U. Marston, who works on thermal shock at the Electric Power Research Institute in Palo Alto, Calif., says there's now strong evidence that neutron bombardment makes the copper clump together.

"Copper starts out in a solid as atoms fairly evenly distributed. Under radiation the atoms tend to come together as copper particles," he said. New instruments that let researchers see atoms within metals show this clumping effect, Marston says.

As the first discoveries of brittle irradiated steel containing copper became known, anxiety began to spread. How much copper was in the steel-al-

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loy walls of reactor vessels across the country? Reactor-vessel manufacturers and utilities began leafing through old files to find what information they had about the copper content of metals in reactors.

Records showed that there was some copper in the vessel walls themselves. "We used a lot of auto stock," explained Marston. "When you melt it, you can't get all the wiring out."

But welds in vessel walls were the real problem. Before the industry realized what was happening, which was about 1972, spools of copper-coated welding wire were routinely used for these welds. "The copper was used to prevent rust," noted Stephen H. Hanauer, director of safety technology at the NRC. "Someone probably got a $10 prize for the suggestion."

Reactor builders switched to nickel-coated electrodes, but they couldn't replace the welds in older reactors. When I visited Marston last winter, the significance of those welds became clear. On his desk was a slab of metal that looked like a paperweight gone wild. I thought it was eight inches wide. But it was really eight inches thick—the thickness of a reactor-vessel wall. The weld was a yellowish stripe in the steel, tapering from three inches thick on one side to two inches on the other. Marston told me that it can take three weeks of repeated passes with electrodes to complete one of those welds. That type of weld, engineered to be a powerful bond between huge steel sections of reactor vessels, contained enough copper to become a potential hazard instead.

Interest in reactor-vessel embrittlement heated up in 1977, Marston recalls. There was trouble with the sample holders in a reactor built by Babcock and Wilcox, one of the major suppliers, he says. Vibration kept knocking them loose. All the samples were taken out, and "it looked worse than we thought," Marston said, indicating that embrittlement was progressing faster than expected in the test samples.

Added to this continued confirmation of embrittled-metal samples and copper contamination of vessels was an event the following year that, for some, increased the alarm.

On March 20, 1978, a worker at the Rancho Seco nuclear generating plant near Sacramento, Calif., dropped a light bulb into an instrument panel. The panel shorted out and the plant's instruments went haywire, flashing fake signals to the control systems. Rancho Seco's emergency cooling system kicked into operation. Cold water

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

flooded into the reactor, dropping the temperature from 582 degrees F to 285 in a little more than an hour.

Pressure inside the reactor vessel first dropped from the normal 2,200 pounds per square inch to under 1,600 psi. Then, as high-pressure water pumps were triggered, the pressure went back over 2,000 psi. With no reliable instrumentation to guide them, control-room technicians kept the cold water flowing, maintaining the combination of unexpectedly low temperature and high pressure for several hours.

The Rancho Seco "transient," as nuclear engineers call it, made it clear that pressurized-water reactors were susceptible to abrupt changes in temperature and pressure. Could any pressurized reactors already have small cracks? And could vessel walls containing such cracks, subjected to sudden changes of temperature and pressure during an accident, then rupture, draining the coolant water and producing a catastrophic meltdown of the core?

The truth is that nobody knows for certain. Calculations indicate that under pressurized-thermal-shock conditions, a reactor vessel will fail only if cracks of a certain dimension are present on the inside wall. Inspections throughout the industry have used ultrasound and other nondestructive testing methods and thus far have found no such cracks. Industry representatives say they are reasonably confident that no cracks are there. Critics say the inspection equipment isn't good enough to detect the cracks. The NRC says its analyses assume that some cracks exist, no matter what inspections show.

Richard Cheverton of the Oak Ridge National Laboratory, whose team has performed many of the thermal-shock analyses, says assumptions about weaknesses in nuclear power plants had to be made. Take the critical issue of cracks in the reactor-vessel walls. "It's difficult to look for flaws after the reactor is in operation, and it's still a question of how good a job one can do," Cheverton said. "It's not clear yet whether some of the shallow flaws that can get us into trouble can be found with accuracy, so we tend to assume that the flaws will be there."

But Richard J. Sero, who heads a program on thermal shock for Westinghouse (a major plant builder), maintains that there is growing evidence to support the belief that the cracks aren't there. Engineers often inspect working-reactor vessels with ultrasound equipment, whose echoes are analyzed to detect anything unusual in the vessel wall—a crack, an inclusion of different material in the metal, an unevenness in the surface.

Ultrasound inspection is complicated somewhat by the fact that reactor vessels have a ⅛-inch-thick cladding—a permanently bonded layer—of stainless steel on the inside surface that can produce false echo patterns. But that's not an insuperable problem. Sero says he's impressed by the sensitivity of the equipment.

"We've done about a half-dozen full-vessel inspections," Sero said. "You do pick up what we call 'indications'—as many as 20 in some vessels. When you pick up any anomalies at all, you must look at your pre-service inspection to see if they existed before and what size they were.

"We've found that the equipment can pick up things like layers in the cladding," Sero continued. "When we've gone to the inspection reports, we've found that there are layers in the cladding at the same depth of the indication. Our conclusion is that in all the inspections we've done, we haven't found any indications that we can't resolve as inclusions of different material or layers."

> “The NRC may consult its Ouija board and get a number, but the error bands are so large, it's useless”

Sero says Westinghouse gained confidence in the inspection results when one test showed a gouge on the outside wall of a reactor vessel. "We were able to get pictures of the reactor vessel that were taken before it was installed," he said. "We found that it was a gouge that existed before it went to the plant." A sample of a vessel wall containing a crack is used to calibrate instruments.

The NRC recently released a detailed study on pressurized thermal shock and reactor safety. If you really want a good fight, ask people about the reliability of those safety estimates. The method the NRC and the industry uses is called probabilistic risk assessment. It's designed to get around a rather impressive lack of concrete evidence. All the calculations about pressurized thermal shock, for example, are based on just eight events that have occurred at nuclear plants, including the Rancho Seco transient and the most famous incident of all, Three Mile Island.

In a probabilistic risk assessment, you estimate the likelihood of an event that initiates a transient, then estimate the likelihood of the reaction to that event, the reaction to that reaction, and so on down the line.

Westinghouse, *for example*, has a computer analysis that starts with 17 possible initiators and runs through event trees to more than 8,200 end points. The NRC has done the same thing. Its numbers come out more or less in agreement about the risk of thermal shock. But there are inevitable differences of opinion about the value of those calculations, which show that although there is no clear and present danger, corrective action should be taken at some reactors to reduce the hazard of thermal shock.

Not everyone agrees with the calculations. "The NRC may consult its Ouija board and come up with a number," said Robert Pollard of the Union of Concerned Scientists, "but the error bands on it are so large that it's essentially useless."

That's not exactly so, says Cheverton of Oak Ridge. "It's possible to estimate what the uncertainty in the analysis is, and you have to live with that uncertainty," he said. "But you take the conservative end of it and work with that."

A lack of data is more or less conceded all through the NRC report. "Perhaps the most significant uncertainty in the treatment . . . is that there are known low-frequency potential over-cooling events much more severe than those that have occurred," the report says at one point. "Because these events have not occurred, they have not been taken into account in the frequency distribution." In other words, it's tough to predict the possibility of something that has never happened. In another section, the report notes "substantial uncertainties" in some estimates and calculations that are uncertain by "plus or minus at least two orders of magnitude, a broad band of uncertainty, indeed."

What else can we do? the NRC people ask. "It isn't well defined, but it's the best information we have," said the NRC's Hanauer.

Your best is none too good, the critics say. They point out that the probabilistic-risk-assessment technique is the same one used in the famous Rasmussen report of 1974, in which a team headed by MIT professor Norman Rasmussen calculated the risks of nuclear accidents. Rasmussen came up with some comfortingly low-risk figures. Just last year, though, the

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NRC looked over the operating data that have accumulated since then and concluded that the odds of a nuclear accident occurring calculated by Rasmussen were low by a factor of 30.

Hanauer says that risk calculators have learned a lot from Rasmussen's pioneering effort. "He kissed off earthquakes in two pages and floods in two lines," Hanauer noted. Taking one volume of a shelf-long safety assessment of the Indian Point reactor near New York City, Hanauer pointed out that earthquakes and floods were toward the top of the list of risks. The NRC has learned to include such risks in its risk assessments, Hanauer says.

But Basdekas dismisses the report as "the quantification of wishful thinking." And George Sih, director of the Institute of Fracture and Solid Mechanics at Lehigh University, says that the impressive report is built on a foundation of sand.

"The samples they study are five inches long, and the vessels are 500 inches long," Sih said. "The sample is very thin, and the vessel is eight inches thick. We don't know how to transfer small-sample data to the design of large-scale structural components. The scaling effect in size and also the scaling effect in time are among the most difficult questions we have."

If critics think the NRC has been too speculative, industry believes the report is too conservative. You can arrive at just about any conclusion you want by putting in the appropriate numbers, Marston says. "By changing the assumptions," he explained, "I can show that one of these things has no useful life at all or a lifetime of 30 to 40 years." The NRC consistently takes the most conservative numbers for its estimates, he says.

One of the key factors that the NRC's experts looked at was the transition temperature at which a piece of metal stops being ductile and becomes brittle enough to break easily. A crucial part of the NRC report was to set a point at which this transition temperature in a given reactor would be cause for concern. The report sets the danger point at 300 degrees F for vertical welds, 270 degrees for horizontal ones.

Higher transition temperatures are worse, since the reactor vessel must be maintained at these temperatures if the effects of brittle metal are to be avoided. The original standard for nuclear reactors was no more than 200 degrees F. The temperature is higher for vertical welds because pressure tends to force the welds out, increasing the possibility that a crack will break through the vessel wall.

Determining a transition temperature depends on the composition of a metal, the amount of radiation it receives, and, most controversially, the stresses to which it is exposed. The NRC staff used a formula to predict how assumed pre-existing cracks might extend into the vessel wall.

As a result of tests on the rate of embrittlement at various plants, the NRC predicted when some of them will reach a danger point. All things considered, the NRC report reached a reasonably comforting conclusion. It listed 40 pressurized-water reactors in which pressurized thermal shock was an issue. "If no one does anything, we've got one reactor that's in big trouble, four others that are a little behind it, and four that are in a mild kind of trouble," Hanauer told me. "The rest of them will not reach the screening criterion [the transition temperature] during the anticipated life of the plant."

> “Though the inner portion is brittle, the outer portion is tough; radiation damage in the wall is attenuated ”

The "big-trouble" generating plant is the H. B. Robinson 2 reactor of Carolina Power and Light. Hanauer calculated that if nothing were done, it would reach the transition-temperature criterion in September of 1987. Turkey Point 3 and 4 in Florida get there in 1988; Calvert Cliffs 1 in Maryland gets there in 1989; and Fort Calhoun in Nebraska arrives in 1990. Rancho Seco, Maine Yankee, Oconee 2 in South Carolina, and Three Mile Island 1 arrive in the 1990s. Everything else is 21st century, Hanauer says.

Reactor manufacturers accepted these numbers without too much argument. "Their conclusions are more or less in line with ours," said Sero of Westinghouse. Sero says that Westinghouse thinks the NRC could set its transition-temperature numbers about 30 degrees lower, but he isn't arguing with the basic premises of the report.

Nuclear critics are. They center their fire on the vast number of assumptions that had to be made in the report because information about the probability of different events occurring and about the reliability of safety systems simply isn't available. Rep. Markey's reaction, for example, was that the risk-assessment technique was "like predicting the winner of the World Series after the first exhibition game."

There's also a lot that the utilities and manufacturers can do to lessen any possible danger, industry experts say. One easy step is to reshuffle the fuel elements in the reactor core, putting older fuel elements, which emit fewer neutrons, close to the vessel wall. "It's easy and cheap to reduce neutron flux by a factor of two," acknowledged Hanauer.

Critics say that repositioning the fuel elements isn't enough. They want American utilities to reduce neutron exposure even further by inserting dummy fuel elements next to the vessel wall. That's been done at two reactors in West Germany and one Russian-built reactor in Finland. But utilities are reluctant to take the reduction in generating capacity that dummy fuel elements bring.

There are many other steps that can be taken, Marston said. One is the marvelously simple measure of heating the emergency cooling water to reduce thermal shock. Keeping the emergency water supply at 120 degrees F rather than room temperature is cheap and effective, Marston says. Thermal shock can also be reduced by adding controls to throttle back the automatic-feedwater system, he notes.

Improved training for reactor operators is another industry option. The idea is to get them ready for all the problems that could lead to a significant transient, then avoid the sequences that end in serious trouble.

The last resort is annealing. The reactor would be shut down, all the fuel elements would be removed, and the vessel would be heated to 850 degrees F for a week. A study done by Westinghouse for the Electric Power Research Institute concluded that annealing would make the vessel walls young again. The process isn't cheap. One report cited costs of $60 million or more for a single reactor, including the price of the electricity that the plant did not generate during the treatment.

No one is thinking about annealing right now. Instead, utilities and manufacturers are making detailed studies of all the factors affecting the thermal-shock issue for individual plants. The NRC report has asked for such a plant-specific report at least three years before a reactor reaches its screening criterion for danger.

For the Robinson 2 reactor, the report would be due in 1984. Carolina Power and Light is hard at work, says

Thomas S. Elleman, who is in charge of nuclear safety. The vessel wall has been inspected, and no cracks were found. New training for reactor personnel is under way. The company is studying a proposal to heat the emergency water supply.

Neutron exposure has been reduced by putting the older fuel elements next to the reactor wall. How much extra time will the program buy? "It's premature to speculate about that," Elleman said.

There's no panic at the NRC, the manufacturers, or the utilities. The problem is well understood, Cheverton says, and the Oak Ridge analysis indicated that even if worse came to worst, a reactor vessel would not break wide open. "Even though the inner portion is brittle, the outer portion still is relatively tough because the radiation damage is attenuated through the wall," Cheverton said. "A crack might be driven through the inner part, but it tends to arrest at the outer part."

But that assessment could easily be wrong, says Pollard of the Union of Concerned Scientists. "There's no dispute that current emergency systems would not be able to cope with a fracture of the reactor vessel," he said. "For other problems, you can make a reasonable argument that you have some defense in depth. The defense-in-depth philosophy disappears when you talk about pressurized thermal shock."

The real problem, Pollard says, is that the nation's nuclear regulators and the manufacturers allowed a major construction program to roar ahead without considering the range of unknown dangers that lay before them.

"The Atomic Energy Commission went forward with all this undue optimism," complained Pollard, who resigned from his job as a regulator years ago in disgust. "Now we're in a position where nothing can be done to correct the mistakes without causing someone undue harm. I expected them to do the job back in the 1960s. Now everyone but the nuclear industry has to suffer."

"My perception is that the problem is well in hand," said Westinghouse's Sero. "We have significant research programs under way, we are putting significant money and engineering efforts into it, and we have a firm understanding that is going to improve, which will show that our predictions were very conservative."
